We investigate the roles of firm and country level agency conflicts in determining corporate payout policies. Based on a large sample of 29,610 firms in 43 countries from 2001 to 2006, we find that in high protection countries, investors are able to use their legal powers to extract cash from firms but their ability to do so can be substantially hindered when agency costs at the firm level are high. In poor protection countries, investors can seek refuge in firm level governance mechanisms to curb agency conflicts, suggesting a substitution between country and firm level investor protection. Finally, compared to repurchases, we find dividends are more likely to be the sole method of payout in high protection countries and in less closely held firms. We investigate the roles of firm and country level agency conflicts in determining corporate payout policies. Based on a large sample of 29,610 firms in 43 countries from 2001 to 2006, we find that in high protection countries, investors are able to use their legal powers to extract cash from firms but their ability to do so can be substantially hindered when agency costs at the firm level are high. In poor protection countries, investors can seek refuge in firm level governance mechanisms to curb agency conflicts, suggesting a substitution between country and firm level investor protection. Finally, compared to repurchases, we find dividends are more likely to be the sole method of payout in high protection countries and in less closely held firms.
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Overall, our findings confirm the generality of the outcome model of corporate payouts. The effectiveness of legal measures to protect outside shareholders differs substantially across countries, as reported by LLSV, but within a country, agency costs differ across firms as well. Consequently, although investors in high protection countries are able to use their legal power to extract cash, either in the form of dividends or repurchases, agency conflicts at the firm level hinder their ability to do so. For example, a one standard deviation decrease in ownership concentration, a proxy for firm level agency costs, is associated with a 2.6% increase in total payouts whereas a one standard deviation increase in ownership independence, another proxy for firm level agency costs, is associated with a 1.7% increase in total payouts.
When the corporate governance score is used to proxy firm level agency costs, a one standard deviation increase in the governance score is associated with a 2.1% increase in total payouts. Finally, insider+ dominated firms, proxying higher firm level agency costs, have a 3.6% lower payout than non insider+ dominated firms. In low protection countries, firm level agency conflicts also matter to payouts with some evidence of substitutions between country and firm level investor protection.
A further implication of the outcome model is that firms with higher investment opportunities have lower payouts only in countries where investors enjoy adequate protection. The use of firm level data allows us to develop a robust test of this argument by including various measures of firm level agency costs in a 2×2×2 matrix of high versus low investor protection, high versus low agency costs, and high versus low growth opportunities. According to the outcome model, in high protection countries, payouts are predicted to decrease as we move from low growth/low agency cost firms to high growth/high agency cost firms. In low protection countries, investors are less able to force firms to disgorge an operating cash surplus, implying we should observe a lower payout ratio relative to firms in high protection countries, irrespective of growth opportunities and other agency costs.
Our results show high growth firms have significantly lower payouts when agency conflicts at both firm and country levels are low. Therefore, in the presence of investment opportunities, investors are 4 willing to defer the receipt of a return on their investment to a later period if they enjoy high protection at both the country and firm levels, consistent with the outcome model. As expected, the strength of the relationship between payouts and growth opportunities is reduced when agency costs at either the country or firm level increase, using ownership independence and insider+dominated firms to proxy firm level agency costs. This implies that although some protection, either at the firm or country level, is at least partly effective in enabling investors to extract surplus cash in the face of investment opportunities, the "best" outcome for corporate payouts occurs when protection is effective at both country and firm levels.
Evidence of substitutions between country and firm level agency costs in the relationship between payouts and growth opportunities is found when we proxy firm level agency costs by ownership concentration and governance quality.
We extend the test of the outcome model to the choice of the form of payout since dividends and share repurchases can play different roles in mitigating agency conflicts. Consistent with predictions, investors in high protection countries are more able to pressure firms to pay the surplus cash in the (preferred) form of committed dividend payments. Agency conflicts at the firm level are also significant in explaining corporate choice of the form of payout. Of the firm level agency cost variables investigated, the outcome model of payout choice is supported when we proxy agency costs by ownership concentration. In countries where investors enjoy greater protection, more closely held (higher agency conflict) firms choose the more flexible option of repurchase while less closely held (lower agency conflict) firms choose dividends, thereby committing to the payout in the longer term.
We subject our findings to a battery of tests and find they are robust to several country and firm level variable specifications, and when we exclude the country that is the most heavily represented in our sample. Industry adjustments are also considered but they do not change the thrust of our conclusions. In the spirit of Spamann (2010), we investigate alternative measures of legal investor protection and add the 5 outcome model of corporate payouts to the list of tests that survive the corrections to the widely used antidirector rights index.
Our paper thus contributes to recent developments in international corporate finance research on the relative importance of firm and country level variables to key corporate policy outcomes. For example, Miller and Reisel (2009) study restrictive covenants attached to public corporate bonds and find that investor protection can be derived not only from legal rights provided by countries' laws but also from rights attached to individual securities at the issuer's discretion. Bruno and Claessens (2007) find a neutral or negative interaction effect between country regulatory regimes and firm corporate governance practices on firm valuation. Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008) conclude firm value is positively related to board independence for a sample of firms with a controlling shareholder in poor protection countries.
Finally, Durnev and Kim (2005) and Klapper and Love (2004) find firms that need external funding adopt stronger governance practices than required by law, especially in weak investor protection countries. We extend this line of research by documenting the relative importance and the interactive effects of the strength of legal investor protection, as a proxy for country level agency conflicts, and firm level agency conflicts in determining corporate payout policy.
An implication of our findings is that the rights of minority shareholders are mostly determined at the country level rather than the firm level, consistent with other recent papers. In particular, Harford, Mansi and Maxwell (2008) report the effects of country level granting and enforcing of shareholder rights dominate the effect of variation in the control of firm level agency conflicts; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007) find that although firm+specific variables are successful in explaining variation in firm level corporate governance and disclosure practices, their explanatory power is dwarfed by that of country characteristics; and Aggarwal, Esrel, Stulz and Williamson (2007) find evidence that countries in which investors are poorly protected have poorer corporate governance as well.
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The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and research method. Section II outlines the sample profile and discusses some univariate results. Results from multivariate analysis of cross+sectional differences in the amount of total payouts and the choice of the form of payouts (i.e., dividends versus share repurchases) are discussed in Section III. Section IV summarizes and concludes the paper.
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Our sample is based on Thomson Financial's Worldscope database. Since share repurchases have become increasingly popular over time, we perform our analysis for the period 2001+2006. We eliminate firm+years with reportedly negative dividends (Field: 04551) and with non+positive sales (Field: 07240), net income (Field: 01751) or operating cash flow (Field: 04201), and financial firms (Field: 04300). Firm+years with missing data on dividends, sales, net income or cash flow, and where dividends and net income exceed sales, are also excluded. So are countries with less than 30 firm+year observations and with mandatory dividend payouts exceeding 25% of net income (Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Greece, Uruguay and Venezuela). Our final sample consists of 87,213 firm+year observations covering 29,610 firms in 43 countries. Appendix I shows the sample coverage by country and year.
For these firms, we obtain accounting data to compute payout ratios as well as variables describing other firm characteristics. Several variables are employed to measure corporate disbursements. We employ funds used to decrease outstanding common or preferred stock (Field: 04751) to proxy for share repurchases (Allen and Michaely, 2003) . Dividend payout is the sum of common and preferred dividends (Field: 04551), while total payout is dividends plus share repurchases. To accommodate differences in accounting standards across countries and changes over time, the three payout measures (dividends, repurchases, and their sum) are scaled either by net income, net cash flow from operations, or net sales.
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We compute the industry+adjusted measure of sales growth rate (Growth), where the growth rate is the average percentage change in the last five years' annual sales. For each firm in a given industry, we make this adjustment relative to the worldwide median for that industry in that year, rather than the country+wide median. The adjustment controls for differences in the growth and maturity of each industry.
To alleviate the impact of data errors and outliers, we trim (set to missing) all payout and other firm characteristic variables outside the 1 st to 99 th percentiles. Appendix II summarizes the definition of all variables, and Appendix III provides correlation statistics.
A. Proxies of agency costs
We refer to the literature for proxies of firm level agency costs. The first proxy we use is ownership concentration. As share ownership becomes concentrated, the nature of the agency problem shifts away from manager+shareholder conflicts to conflicts between the controlling owner and minority shareholders (Hope (2003) ; Fan and Wong (2002) ; Berle and Means (1932) ). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that when ownership gets beyond a certain point, large owners gain nearly full control of the company and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits that are not shared by minority shareholders. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) highlight the significance of this agency problem when they report that highly concentrated ownership in East Asian nations diminishes firm value. 5 We measure ownership concentration using the fraction of shares that are closely held, as defined by Worldscope (Field: 08021), 6 and denote it as CloselyHeld.
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We investigate another dimension of share ownership, based on the independence indicator in the Osiris database from Bureau van Dijk. This indicator characterizes the degree of independence of a company with regard to its shareholders. Osiris provides 10 degrees of independence (A+, A, A+, B+, B, B+, C+, C, C+ and D), 7 which we convert into a score of 1 to 10 and denote this variable by Independence, with a score of 10 indicating the highest degree of independence and thus the lowest agency cost.
From Osiris, we also extract information on the identity of the ultimate shareholder, defined as the largest shareholder with a direct and indirect holding greater than 25% of outstanding shares. Osiris assigns an A (Independence>8) if the firm has no recorded shareholders with more than 25% direct or total ownership. "A" firms are thus considered to be independent with no ultimate owner. "B" firms (5≤Independence≤7) have no recorded shareholders with more than 50% direct or total ownership, and one or more shareholders are recorded with more than 25% direct or total ownership. Firms are categorized "C" when they have one recorded shareholder with more than 50% direct or total ownership or when the source indicates that the company has an ultimate owner. "D" firms have one recorded shareholder with a direct ownership of over 50%. Since only "A" firms are truly independent, we also set Independence>8 as a dummy in the analysis. Similar results are obtained.
8 Using other cutoffs (5%, 10% and 20%) yields similar conclusions. We base our analysis on the 25% cutoff since it provides a more powerful sample design by allowing us to focus our tests on firms that offer the most latitude for opportunistic behavior toward minority shareholders, and its implications for payout policy.
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(Gristein and Michaely (2005)), while states or public authorities may prefer higher payouts for political reasons. 10 The controlling groups other than insiders are thus treated primarily as control variables in our tests. In testing the importance of these controlling owners in relation to payouts, we control for the percentage shareholding by the ultimate shareholder (Ultimate).
We also proxy firm level agency costs by the quality of corporate governance using the measure developed by Brown and Caylor (2006) . Governance is the equally weighted score of seven governance factors, as assessed by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). 11 Firms with higher corporate governance scores are expected to have lower agency costs since the ability of insiders to expropriate minority shareholders' interests in these firms is more restricted, ceteris paribus.
Our country level proxies for agency costs capture the quality of the legal framework, as in LLSV.
The first measure is a dummy that equals one if a firm is headquartered in a civil law country, and zero otherwise. We also proxy the quality of investor protection using the LLSV's antidirector rights index and its revised and corrected measures sourced from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez+De+Silanes and Shleifer (2008) and Spamann (2010), respectively. The final measure is the anti self+dealing index, which provides a measure of shareholder protection from self+dealing by corporate insiders through corporate law.
B. Control variables
We control for differences in firm size in tests of the outcome model of total payouts. We measure firm size by the percentile market value of ordinary shares, the product of the number of shares outstanding and share price, for each country. This procedure ensures that the results are not swamped by countries with 10 In China, government+controlled firms use dividend payments to tunnel resources from listed companies thus exacerbating the agency problem (Chen, Jian and Xu (2009) ). However, we do not have any evidence to show that dividends are also used by governments in other countries as a tunneling tool.
11 The governance variable includes two external corporate governance factors (no unauthorized poison pills and no staggered board) and five internal corporate governance factors: option re+pricing did not occur within the last three years; average options granted in the past three years as a percentage of basic shares outstanding did not exceed 3% (option burn rate is not excessive); all directors attended at least 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse for non+attendance; board guidelines are in each proxy statement; and directors are subject to stock ownership guidelines. in countries where the legal system is based on common law compared to countries with a civil law system.
In particular, the median total payout ratio is 13.2% (1.2%) of cash flow (sales) in common law countries and 10.9% (0.9%) in civil law countries, respectively. These differences are economically and statistically significant. However when payouts are measured as a fraction of earnings, we do not find statistically We begin our analysis by examining the outcome model of corporate payouts using total payouts, i.e. the sum of dividends and share repurchases, as the dependent variable. As in the LLSV's original regression, we regress the total payout ratio on proxies for country level investor protection, a measure of growth opportunities, and its interaction with investor protection. Since the choice of denominator in the total payout ratio does not materially affect our conclusion, we report in detail only the results for the most common measure, Payout/Earnings.
In the spirit of Spamann (2010), we run the tests using the various proxies of investor protection: legal regime; the LLSV's original antidirector rights index; the revised (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez+De+
Silanes and Shleifer (2008)) and corrected (Spamann (2010)) antidirector rights index; and the anti self+ dealing index (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez+De+Silanes and Shleifer (2008) ). In addition to using these indices in their continuous form, we also transform them to dummies signaling low shareholder protection by setting them equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a country whose index value is below the median shareholder protection index at the country level, and zero otherwise. For ease of interpretation, we use the binary variable of investor protection in the interaction term. The decile rank of the firm's industry+ adjusted historical annual sales growth rate (Growth) is used to proxy growth opportunities.
We employ generalized least squares (GLS) random effects panel regressions with robust standard errors to estimate our models. We do not use firm fixed effects due to the lack of variability in firm characteristics over our relatively short period of study. protection countries, a relatively ineffective legal system has a greater influence on corporate payout policy than any incentive managers may have to signal non+expropriation by distributing cash to shareholders. As articulated by LLSV, shareholders in weak protection countries will try to grab whatever cash they can get immediately, even though the amount may not be much. This prediction is however not supported using the continuous original and revised measures of antidirector rights index.
The coefficient on sales growth (Growth) is significantly negative in all specifications. Its interaction with investor protection has a significantly positive coefficient when we proxy investor protection using the binary measure of the original and Spamann's antidirector rights index, and the anti self+dealing index.
When we use the continuous measure of investor protection, the interaction term is significantly positive for the Spamann's measure. These results thus suggest that, in countries where investors enjoy greater protection, high growth firms have lower payouts presumably because investors know that when the company's investments pay off, they will be able to extract more cash. This is in sharp contrast to weak protection countries, where sales growth matters less in shaping corporate payout policy. Results from the Spamann's antidirector right index show a one decile increase in growth is associated with a 1.9% decrease 14 in payouts in high protection countries versus 1.7% in low protection countries. The revised antidirector rights index again yields findings contrary to the outcome model.
In sum, results appear sensitive to the measure of investor protection used, with the revised antidirector rights index bearing results that often are different from other measures of investor protection.
This finding is in line with the evidence in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez+De+Silanes and Shleifer (2008) (2010)), we therefore focus on this measure in subsequent tests.
Including share repurchases in the payout ratio does not appear to matter much. This is perhaps not surprising since at least in the United States repurchases are largely the province of dividend payers (Fama and French, 2001 ).
B. Country and firm level agency costs and total payouts
In Specification (3) which shows that when we control for the quality of firms' corporate governance, the negative relationship between growth and payouts is stronger in low protection countries. Nevertheless, a caveat on this finding is in order since the ISS database covers mainly large and mid+cap firms.
Firm level proxies of agency conflicts are important in explaining total payouts. All of them are significant and have the expected sign. Our results are thus consistent with the outcome model that high agency cost firms distribute less of their earnings to shareholders. In high protection countries, a one standard deviation decrease in the extent to which shares are closely held (equivalent to 25.9%) is associated with a 2.6% increase in total payouts (Specification (1)) whereas a one standard deviation increase in ownership independence (equivalent to 3.1 units) is associated with a 1.7% increase in total payouts (Specification (2)). The interaction terms show that these relationships are not significantly different between high and low protection countries.
Better governed firms have higher payouts, consistent with the outcome model. The positive relationship between governance quality and payouts appears to be stronger in low protection countries, suggesting some substitutions between country and firm level governance mechanisms to curb agency conflicts. A one standard deviation increase in the corporate governance score (equivalent to 1.20 units) is associated with a 2.1% increase in total payouts in high protection countries versus 6.2% in low protection countries (Specification (3)), all else equal. The same caveat about the usage of ISS data however applies.
The identity of the ultimate owner also matters to payouts. Controlling for the percentage shareholding by the ultimate owner (Ultimate), results show firms whose ultimate shareholder is an insider have significantly lower payouts, consistent with the proposition that insiders pursue financial decisions that allow greater rent extraction (Grossman and Hart (1988)). Specifically, insider+dominated firms in high protection countries have a 3.6% lower payout (Specification (4)) than non insider+dominated firms.
Having a financial institution or government (state) as the ultimate shareholder does not appear to matter to corporate payouts.
Overall, we find support for the outcome model of total payouts using country level proxies of agency conflicts. These results mostly remain when firm level agency cost variables are controlled for in the tests. Although investors in high protection countries have the legal power to extract cash (in the form of dividends or share repurchases), we find agency conflicts at the firm level hinder their ability to do so. Firm level agency conflicts also matter to payouts in low protection countries. Notwithstanding the nature of firms covered by ISS, our results suggest that investor protection can be derived not only from legal rights provided by countries' laws but also from firm level governance mechanisms. Evidence of substitutions between country and firm level investor protection has also been documented elsewhere in the literature (2004)).
C. The interaction between investment opportunities and agency costs on total payouts
LLSV show that investment opportunities reduce dividend payouts in high protection countries but are unrelated to dividend payouts in low protection countries. We find support for this relationship using total payouts for a larger sample drawn from a more recent and substantially longer time period. To test how firm level agency costs moderate this relationship, we first perform univariate tests of difference in total payouts for a 2×2×2 matrix of investor protection, growth opportunities, and firm level agency costs.
Within this matrix, the best case scenario for investors insofar as payouts are concerned is when country level investor protection is high, and both growth opportunities and firm level agency costs are low, while the worst case scenario is when country level investor protection is low, and both growth opportunities and firm level agency costs are high. Table VI reports the univariate results. Irrespective of the level of protection investors enjoy at the country level, firms with low growth opportunities and agency costs have the highest payout. We do not find the difference in payouts for these two sets of firms to be significant across low and high protection countries. Interestingly, corporate governance quality appears to matter more in determining total payouts in low protection than high protection countries. In low protection countries, the difference in the average (median) payout between firms with high and low governance quality is about 18% (27%), irrespective of firm level growth opportunities. In comparison, in high protection countries, the difference in the average (median) payout is 0.8% (1.7%) for low growth firms and 4.1% (8.8%) for high growth firms. This finding reinforces the above evidence of substitutions between country and firm level investor protection.
Importantly, Table VI shows that, in addition to country level investor protection and growth opportunities, firm level agency costs also matter to payouts.
<Table VI>
Multiple regressions for the interaction between country level agency costs (as proxied by investor legal protection), firm level agency costs, and investment opportunities in relation to total payouts are reported in Table VII . For ease of interpretation of the results for interaction variables, we use the binary Spamann's antidirector rights index as the country level investor protection measure. For each measure of firm level agency cost, the sample median provides the cutoff for "high" and "low"; the exception is Independence where the cutoff is a score of 8 (i.e., all "A" firms according to Osiris). Firms with insiders as the ultimate owner are considered to have "high" agency costs and, as before, are denoted by the dummy Insider. In the regression:
the shift in the level of payout due to agency conflicts at the country and firm levels is represented by the β coefficients and the γ coefficients describe the relationship between growth opportunities and total payouts for firms with different country and firm level agency costs. We again lag all right hand side variables by one period to address potential endogeneity concerns.
<Table VII> Looking at the β coefficients, results show that the average payout amount for low agency cost firms in high protection countries, as captured by the intercept term β 0, is significantly positive. It is 32.3% in Specification (2), when firm level agency costs are measured by ownership independence. Moving to high agency cost firms in high protection countries reduces the payout to 22.9% (β 0 +β 2 ). This drop in the payout amount (by 9.4%) is both statistically and economically greater (more than four times) than that observed for low protection countries. For low protection countries, moving from firms with low agency costs (β 0 +β 1 =28.1%) to high agency costs (β 0 +β 1 +β 2 +β 3 =26.3%) sees a reduction in total payouts by a magnitude of 2.2%.
Therefore, although protection at either the firm or country level appears to be effective in increasing investors' ability to extract surplus cash from firms, our regression results show that investors' ability to do so is significantly enhanced if protection is provided at both the firm and country levels. The effectiveness of investor protection at the firm level in forcing firms to disgorge surplus cash is significantly greater in high protection countries. This finding is robust to alternative measures of firm level agency costs.
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The γ coefficients describe the relationship between growth opportunities and total payouts for the following groups of firms: γ 1 for low agency cost firms in high protection countries; γ 1 +γ 3 for high agency cost firms in high protection countries; γ 1 +γ 2 for low agency cost firms in low protection countries; and γ 1 +γ 2 +γ 3 +γ 4 for high agency cost firms in low protection countries. An implication of the outcome model which we test here is that the relationship between investment opportunities and total payouts is strongest when country and firm level agency costs are low, but weakest when country and firm level agency costs are high. In between these extremes lie the cases where country and firm agency costs are in conflict, i.e., agency costs are high at the country level but low at the firm level, and low at the country level but high at the firm level.
The estimated coefficient on Growth (γ 1 ) is significantly negative, implying that high growth firms have significantly lower payouts when agency conflicts at both firm and country levels are low. This supports a prediction of the outcome model that in the presence of investment opportunities, investors are willing to defer the receipt of a return on their investment to a later period if they enjoy high protection at both the country and firm levels. For these firms, a one decile increase in growth decreases total payouts by about 2.2% (Specification (2)).
Specification (2) shows that, as expected, the strength of the relationship between payouts and growth opportunities is reduced as agency costs at either the country or firm level increase. In high protection countries, a one decile increase in growth decreases the total payout by 0.8% (γ 1 +γ 3 ) for high agency cost firms, which is significantly lower than the 2.2% (γ 1 ) for low agency cost firms. In low protection countries, a one decile increase in growth decreases the total payout by 1.8% for low agency cost firms (γ 1 +γ 2 ) and 1.3% for high agency cost firms (γ 1 +γ 2 +γ 3 +γ 4 ). This pattern is also observed in Specification (4) when firm level agency costs are proxied by Insider, thus corroborating our findings of greater importance of firm level agency costs and growth opportunities in determining corporate payouts in high protection countries. Some protection, either at the firm or country level, is effective in enabling 20 investors to extract surplus cash in the face of investment opportunities, but the "best" outcome for corporate payouts occurs when protection is provided at both country and firm levels.
However, we find evidence of possible substitutions between firm and country level investor protection when CloselyHeld and Governance are used to proxy firm level agency costs. For these measures, the negative relationship between growth and payouts is strongest when agency costs are high at both firm and country levels.
D. Dividends or repurchases?
In this section, we extend our tests of the outcome model to the choice of the form of payout (dividends only versus share repurchases) since dividends and share repurchases can play different roles in mitigating agency conflicts and their effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism depends on the extent of shareholder protection. Under the outcome model, shareholders in high protection countries are more able to use their legal powers to pressure firms to disgorge cash and, by extension, to dictate the preferred form of payout,
i.e., committed dividend payments. Dividends are a stronger commitment device than repurchases since management is expected to maintain a stable dividend policy (Lintner (1956)) rather than a stable repurchase policy, 15 particularly in high protection countries (Brown, How and Verhoeven (2008) ). As a consequence, dividends are more likely to be the form of payout in high protection countries. Where shareholder protection is poor, we would not necessarily expect such a relationship. Shareholders in poor protection countries are likely to welcome any cash distribution -which may not be much, as the preceding sections show -irrespective of the form that the cash distribution takes. Table VIII reports the results from logistic regressions using a reduced sample of firms in countries where share repurchases were legal. 16 The reported coefficients show the marginal effects, calculated at the mean value of the continuous variables using the method proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) . We employ random effects panel logit regressions with robust standard errors where the dependent variable takes a value of one for firms with an increase in dividends (as their sole method of payment) and zero for firms with a share repurchase. For these firms, the substitution between the forms of payout is more obvious.
Other determinants of the payout choice, as identified from the literature, are controlled for in our tests and are lagged, as before.
<Table VIII>
Consistent with the outcome model, results show the estimated coefficient on Investor Protection is significantly positive in all specifications except for (3). In Specification (1), for instance, firms in higher protection countries have a 0.8% higher probability, on average, of choosing dividends as the form of payout. Therefore, in higher protection countries, investors are more able to dictate that firms' cash disbursements take the (preferred) form of dividends. This is consistent with dividends having less of a signaling role to play in poorer protection countries, where managers are more insulated from investor pressure, information asymmetry is likely to be resolved by direct communication between insiders and major stakeholder representatives, shareholdings are more concentrated, and minority shareholders are less protected (Brown, How and Verhoeven (2008) ). The results are robust to controlling for firm level agency costs and other variables. Agency conflicts at the firm level are also significant in explaining corporate choice of the form of payout. Of the firm level agency cost variables investigated, the outcome model of payout choice is supported for the CloselyHeld variable in Specification (1). Specifically, in countries where investors enjoy greater protection, more closely held firms (higher agency conflict) tend to choose the more flexible option of repurchase while less closely held firms are more likely to choose dividends, thereby committing to the payout in the longer term. The reverse is observed for low investor protection countries.
Although Independence (Specification (2)) and Insider (Specification (4)) are significant, their sign is opposite to the outcome model's prediction of corporate payout choice. Independence has a significantly negative coefficient while its interaction with the investor protection dummy is significantly positive.
Therefore, in high protection countries, dividends are less likely to be chosen as the preferred form of corporate payout by more independent firms. This association is much weaker in low protection countries.
The identity of the ultimate owner is relevant to the form of payout choice in high protection countries. Controlling for the percentage shareholding by the ultimate owner, insider+dominated firms in high protection countries have a 0.75% higher probability, on average, of choosing dividends as the form of payout. The relationship between the identity of this ultimate owner and the payout choice is however flatter in low protection countries. While governance quality is not significant, its interaction with the low protection dummy is, suggesting that better governed firms in low protection countries are significantly more likely to choose dividends as a form of payout than their counterparts in high protection countries.
The results for these firm level agency costs are thus more in line with the pre+commitment explanation of payout policy design (John and Knyazeva (2006)). The absence of a strong monitoring structure exacerbates the agency conflict and increases the demand for dividend pre+commitment so that firms with higher agency costs are more likely to choose the more costly method of cash distribution, i.e.
dividends, as the form of payout.
The above results are robust in the presence of other determinants of payout choice. Differences in tax rates between dividend income and capital gains have been suggested as a determinant of a firm's choice between distributing funds as dividends or repurchasing shares (Moser, 2005) . This is supported by our results, which show a positive marginal effect of the dividend tax advantage variable (TaxAdvantage) on the probability of the payment of dividends. The marginal effect of earnings volatility (Volatility), measured by the standard deviation of earnings over the past five years divided by its average over the same period, is significantly negative. This is consistent with repurchases being the preferred instrument for the distribution of temporary, unsustainable cash flows (Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000); Guay and Harford (2000)).
The existence of managerial stock options is likely to have an effect on the payout choice since managers who own stock options that are not dividend protected favor repurchases over dividends. 
E. Further Robustness Tests
We address a number of additional robustness issues in this section. The results are reported in Table IX .
First, we note that the United States constitutes a relatively large proportion of the sample, as shown in Appendix I. To ensure our results are not driven by this country, we exclude it from the tests but find the results in Specification (1) for total payouts and Specification (6) for the choice of the form of payout do not change the conclusions in any material way.
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We also test the robustness of our findings to altenative variable specifications. For example, in Specification (2), we subtract the industry median from the dependent variable but find the adjustment does not change the thrust of our results. We construct an index of corporate governance practices based on the 44 governance factors produced by ISS 17 and use this to proxy firm level agency costs in Specification (3). It is highly correlated with the governance index we use in the paper (the correlation coefficient is 0.64). Not surprisingly, qualitatively similar results are obtained using this broader based governance index. Specifications (4) and (5) show qualitatively similar results are obtained when we cluster the standard errors by firm and when we use a tobit regression, respectively. repurchases. This is consistent with shareholders in countries with an efficient legal system being able to pressure firms to distribute the free cash flow instead of using it for the private benefit of insiders. We investigate a number of alternative methods used to calibrate investor protection and find the corrected antidirector rights index by Spamann (2010) yields the strongest and most consistent results. We therefore add the outcome model of corporate payouts to the list of tests that survive the corrections to the antidirector rights index (Spamann (2010)).
While the extent of legal protection of outside shareholders differs substantially across countries, our results show firm level proxies of agency conflicts are also important in explaining corporate payouts.
Although investors have the legal power to extract cash in the form of dividends or share repurchases from 17 For a description of these governance factors, refer to Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson (2007) .
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firms in high protection countries, their ability to do so can be substantially hindered by agency costs at the firm level. In poor protection countries, investors can seek refuge in firm level governance mechanisms to curb agency conflicts, suggesting a substitution between country and firm level investor protection. Also consistent with the outcome model, we find that investment opportunities are negatively related to total payouts, and that this relationship is stronger in high protection countries. Taken together, our results
show firm level agency conflicts and growth opportunities are important in determining payouts in high protection countries, but often less so in low protection countries. More importantly, the results suggest that having investor protection at both firm and country levels yields the most effective outcome, when assessed in terms of the extent to which investors can extract surplus cash from firms.
We extend the test of the outcome model to consider the form of corporate payout. Our results
show that, apart from their ability to extract cash from firms, investors in high protection countries are better able to dictate a more durable form of cash distribution, i.e. committed dividend payments. At the firm level, support for the outcome model of payout choice is found only when the extent to which the shares are closely held is used to proxy agency conflict.
In sum, our findings are consistent with DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner's (2008) conclusion that a simple asymmetric information framework that emphasizes the need to distribute free cash flows and that embeds agency costs (as in Jensen (1986) An indicator of the extent to which firms are independent from its shareholders. Obtained from Bureau van Dijk's Osiris data base, which we convert into a score of 1 to 10 with a score of 10 indicating the highest degree of independence. Governance
An equally weighted score of seven governance factors from Institutional Shareholder Services: (i) no unauthorized poison pills; (ii) no staggered board; (iii) option re+pricing did not occur within the last three years; (iv) average options granted in the past three years as a percentage of basic shares outstanding did not exceed 3%; (v) all directors attended at least 75% of board meetings or had a valid excuse for non+attendance; (vi) board guidelines are in each proxy statement; and (vii) directors are subject to stock ownership guidelines.
Insider A dummy variable that takes a value of one if the ultimate shareholder comprises individuals, families, managers and employees. LowProtection A dummy indicating low investor protection, proxied by (i) legal regime, where it takes a value of one if the firm is domiciled in a civil law country and zero in a common law country; (ii) the anti director rights index; and (iii) the anti self+ dealing index. In (ii) and (iii), LowProtection takes a value of one if the firm is headquartered in a country whose index value is below the median shareholder protection index at the country level and zero otherwise. The anti director rights index is based on the original LLSV, the revised (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez+De+Silanes and Shleifer, 2008), and the corrected (Spamann, 2010) measures. Legal since 1999. Section 85(1) of the Companies Act 1973, as amended by the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999, enables a company to acquire its own shares provided that it is authorized to do so by its articles of association and the share repurchases has been approved by a special resolution passed by the members of the company. There are no restrictions on the source of the funds utilized to acquire the company's shares. Source: Nidal Rashid Sabri (2003) . http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=450042
Spain Allowed since at least 1990. Article 75 of the Spanish Law of Public Limited Companies states that the nominal value of acquired shares shall not exceed 10% of equity capital (reduced to 5% when shares are traded in the secondary official stock market). That is, a maximum of 5% of common stock may be bought back and kept as treasury stocks. Must be authorized by General Assembly. Source: González and González (2004 Legal since 1981. SEC adopted safe+harbor rule (10b+18) in 1982. Before executing a repurchase transaction, a UK firm must have articles of association permitting repurchases and a special resolution conferring repurchase authority. A special resolution requires a firm to send a meeting notice to shareholders and to obtain a 75% majority of shares voting at the meeting. Sections 160 (1) and (2) Growth is the decile rank of industry+adjusted historical annual sales growth rates. The proxy used for firm level agency costs is shown in the heading of columns (1)+(4). Companies have a low degree of independence from shareholders if Independence <8 and are considered to have high agency cost. For the remaining firm+level agency cost measures, "Low" and "High", respectively, take a value of one for values lower or higher than the sample median, and zero otherwise. CloselyHeld is the fraction of shares closely held in a firm. Governance is the ISS corporate governance index. Insider, State and FinInstitutions, respectively, take the value of one for firms with insiders, states, or financial institutions as the ultimate owner, and zero otherwise. Ultimate is the percentage shareholding of the ultimate shareholder. p+values are reported in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Industry dummies and market capitalization are included but not reported.
(1) (2) where it is the industry+adjusted ratio of total payouts to earnings and for (6) where it takes a value of one for firms with an increase in dividends (as their sole method of payments) and zero for firms with share repurchases. Investor Protection is the Spamann's measure of antidirector rights index. LowProtection takes a value of one if Spamann's antidirector index<sample median, and zero otherwise. The proxy used for firm level agency costs is Independence except for (3) which uses a governance score based on the 44 factors from ISS. Companies have a low degree of independence from shareholders if Independence <8 and are considered to have high agency cost. For governance quality, "Low" and "High", respectively, take a value of one for values lower or higher than the sample median, and zero otherwise. Growth is the decile rank of industry+adjusted historical annual sales growth rates. Volatility is the standard deviation of annual income for the last 5 years divided by the average income. TaxAdvantage is dividend tax disadvantage. Options is a dummy variable indicating the presence of employee stock options. In (4), standard errors are clustered at the firm value, and (5) reports results from tobit regression. p+values are reported in parentheses. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Country and industry dummies and firm size are included but not reported.
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